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DECONSTRUCTING ROE V. WADE'S 
BIRTH WALL: OPPORTUNITIES AND 
DANGERS* 
Richard Stith 
In its famous 1973 decision, Roe v. Wade, the United States 
Supreme Court mandated elective abortion up to viability and 
abortion for broadly defined "health" reasons (i.e., virtually 
elective abortion) thereafter 1. That opinion contains a deep con-
tradiction which can be understood as a conflict between nomi-
nalism and realism. The Court asserts in effect that the unborn 
child has no real nature, that what it is called is solely a matter of 
* This is an expanded version of a paper presented at a plenary panel 
discussion on United States abortion Law at the University Faculty for Life 
annual meeting (Toronto, 5 June 1998). Copyright © 1998 by Richard Stith. 
All rights reserved. 
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973). At 165, after spelling out 
the right to postviability abortions for health reasons. Roe directs the reader to 
its companion case Doe v. Bolton 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Doe, in turn, at 192 
indicates that, to the Court, the word "Health" includes all factors - even 
"psychological" and "familial" - relevant to maternal well-being. 
Even after viability, Roe continues to refer to the fetus as only "the 
potentiality of human life" (162, 164) and permits states to leave it entirely 
unprotected (164-65). 
The federal appellate court for the Third Circuit has read Roe and Doe to 
grant a constitutional right intentionally to kill a fetus even after viability 
simply because "the unborn child's survival" would have a "potential psycho-
logical or emotional impact on the mother". Thornburgh v. American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 737 F. 2d 283, 299 (3d Cir. 1984). 
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the conventions of labeling. Yet the moment of birth is assumed to 
mark an essential difference, a real (not merely conventional) 
transition to a living entity human in nature. 
In the past twenty five years, this "birth wall" has been largely 
dismantled or, to use appropriately the more fashionable expres-
sion, "deconstructed". That is, the purely nominal character of the 
birth difference has become increasingly accepted by those on both 
sides of the abortion debate. This essay seeks to elucidate this shift 
and to show the possibilities and perils of our emerging legal 
world. 
Roe's nominalism can be seen most simply in Justice Black-
mun's well-known assertion that he "need not resolve the difficult 
question of when life begins" 2 in order to justify the Court's 
requirement that legislators treat the fetus at most as "the 
potentiality of human life" right up to the moment of birth 3. There 
is no need, he says, to answer this question because the diversity 
of answers given by others shows the question to be un-
answerable, at least at present. But surely the law may take 
controvertible stands, and it may seek to minimize the possible 
harm of error even where it has no access to truth. Blackmun's 
insistence that what we call the fetus does not matter seems to 
imply a much more radical agnosticism: the assumption that the 
names we give to preborn human beings are wholly conventional, 
that one can in principle never say that abortion really takes a 
human life. 
Blackmun's justificatory history of permissive abortion prac-
tices bears out this appearance of deep-seated nominalism. Let me 
explain. In order to decide whether or not practices of past ages 
can be justified today, we ought to look not only at the practices 
themselves (e.g., practices of permitting abortion), but also at the 
beliefs about values and facts upon which those practices were 
2. Roe v. Wade, supra note 1, at 159. 
3. Id. at 164. 
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based. If those underlying values now seem to us quite mistaken, 
the practices arising from those beliefs acquire no precendential 
authority for us today 4. Similarly, we cannot honestly invoke the 
authority of past scientific conclusions if we now see that the data 
upon which the conclusions were based were incomplete or 
4. For example, if we looked only at historical popularity, there is one 
legal and moral practice when we ought to adopt immediately. It has existed 
in almost every major civilization from earliest history right down to the 
nineteenth century. I am speaking of slavery. Why do we not imitate past 
social practices and reintroduce slavery? Obviously, we reject slavery because 
we think these past practices were based either upon unacceptable values (as in 
the ancient world, where the intrinsic dignity of human beings was not an 
article of faith) or upon erroneous facts (as in the U.S., where the myth of 
black inferiority helped support the slave system). Consequently, this almost 
universal historical practice of slavery provides no precedent whatsoever for the 
reintroduction of slavery today. 
In the same way, we can see that although some pre-twentieth century 
societies have permitted abortion, they have always done so for reasons which 
we today would reject. For example, Justice Blackmun appeals to ancient 
Rome and Greece as precedents. But the ancient world lacked both modern 
scientific knowledge of life in the wonb, and our moderne belief in the sanctity 
of the human individual. (Rome, for example, permitted infanticide as well 
abortion). On the other hand, the author of the Hippocratic Oath, the great 
ethical foundation of modern medicine, believed both in the continuity and in 
the sanctity of life - and therefore the oath forbids abortion. Which precedent is 
more compelling depends on which underlying beliefs we today find more 
plausible. 
Or again, during many of the Christian centuries there was a widely-held 
biological theory which placed the beginning of life at what was called 
"quickening" ("quick" here meaning "alive"), which supposedly occurred in 
mid-pregnancy. One can hardly fault these centuries for permitting abortion 
prior to quickening, because even though they believed in or modern value of 
the individual, their facts were wrong. We now know tha quickening designates 
only the mother's sudden perception of movement, rather than an infusion of 
life. In fact, we not know that bodily movement begins in very early 
pregnancy, and heartbeat still earlier, long before it can be perceived without 
the aid of medical instruments. Two centuries ago a morally serious person 
could permit early abortion because she could honestly believe that life had not 
yet begun, but this position could not be honestly and seriously taken today. 
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mistaken. If we seek to know what is real, we cannot rest content 
with labels. We have to inquire into reasons. 
Yet throughout Justice Blackmun's lengthy surveys of past 
practices allowing abortion5, he never once asks whether or not the 
beliefs upon which those practices were based are in fact ones 
which he considers admirable or accurate. (By contrast, by the 
way, he occasionally does try to refute past reasons for restricting 
abortion - such as to protect the mother's life 6). 
For example, Blackmun refers often to "quickening" as a 
popular dividing line, without once mentioning that modern medi-
cal knowledge shows this "event", as he calls it 7 , to be an illusion. 
The overall impression that Blackmun gives is that whether and 
when abortion is allowed is a matter of quaint religions and 
conventions 8. 
At the same time, Blackmun suggests (without exactly stating) 
that birth makes a real difference. Such a claim is arguably implicit 
in his refusal to find that constitutional personhood 9 or actual 
5. Id. at 129-41, 160-61. 
6. Id. at 148-49. 
7. Id. at 160. 
8. If, on the other hand, Justice Blackmun has factored out all erroneus 
medical data as well as all purely religious doctrines about ensoulment and the 
like (especially the ones in which no one any longer believes) he would have 
found far more agreement that the continuity and dignity of developing human 
life demand its protection. 
Indeed, I would argue that, at all times and places until the mid-twentieth 
century, legal protection of the fetus has increased in direct proportion to 
increased medical knowledge of the continuity of life and to increased adherence 
to individual human dignity. 
9. Id. at 256-59. Blackmun concludes that the fetus at no stage possesses 
constitutional personhood prior to his asking whether the fetus counts as a 
living human being. Thus Roe must clearly be read to be wholly nominalist 
with regard to the legal name "person", even if not with regard to the extra-
legal name "human being", since Blackmun thinks that the extent of that legal 
appellation can be ascertained by looking only at positive law, without regard 
to natural realities. 
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human l i fe 1 0 begins "before live bir th" 1 1 . In any event, Justice 
Stevens, writing thirteen years later in support of Roe v. Wade, 
makes clear the necessity of what I have here called "the birth 
wall". Concurring in Thornburgh v. American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (1986) 1 2 , he insists that 
There is a fundamental and well-recognized difference between a 
fetus and a human being; indeed, if there is not such a difference, the 
permissibility of terminating the life of a fetus could scarcely be left 
to the will of the statem legislatures 1 3. 
In the next sentence, Stevens makes clear that, in his view, 
passage through the maternal birth canal changes "the 9-month-
gestated, fully sentient fetus on the eve of bir th" 1 4 into a human 
being. 
Stevens gives no explanation for his claim that a fundamental 
change at birth is required in order to justify legal abortion. But 
one basis for his view is surely the principle of human equality that 
underlies both our ethics and our law. There must be a real and 
deep difference between human and non-human entities in order to 
give force and limit to the normative demand for equal protection 
for all humans. If any and all entities could be defined at will into 
or out of humanity, human equality would have no practical 
significance. Insofar as human equality does make practical 
demands on us, it follows that we are committed to ontological 
realism. Stevens has to claim a split in being between fetus and 
infant in order to avoid recognizing a right to life in principle 1 5 
10. Id. at 161-62. 
11. Id. at 161. 
12. 475 U.S. 747 (1986). 
13. Id. at 779. 
14. Id. 
15. This is not to say that its location might not dictate different tech-
niques of protection. Consider, for example, the German abortion cases (at 
notes 47 and 48 infra, and accompanying text) which hold that, despite the 
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equal before and after birth. Only if expulsion from the womb 
gives the fetus a human nature for the first time is late-term 
abortion easily justified. 
We are thus bequeathed a curious antinomy by Roe. We are to 
presume that the unborn child or fetus has no inner nature of its 
own. What it is called is a matter of convention or preference, for it 
is not "really" anything at all. At the same time, we must assume 
that birth is a bright line, a moment when (in reality not merely in 
convention) by leaving the uterus, the fetus becomes undeniably 
one of us. In other words, we are to be skeptical nominalists prior 
to birth, but credulous realists about birth itself. 
It should have been obvious, even to Stevens, that his notion of 
a clear, fundamental difference at birth was not viable. The many 
postmodern nominalists among us (especially among academics) 
could hardly have been expected to accept his mere assertion that a 
bright line between human and non-human exists at birth. If 
definition in principle is social construction, Stevens' definition of 
humanity will inevitably be deconstructed by those who have the 
political will to do so - i.e., those interested in protecting the 
unborn or in justifying infanticide (of which more below). 
But even non-postmodern realists (count here most non-
academics) must in the end reject Stevens' view, because it claims 
that what something is depends upon where it is. He make the 
fundamental nature of the perinatal entity depend solely upon its 
location. But location cannot determine a being's inner nature, 
though location may well affect how that being functions for others 
and thus affect what they name it. That is, the jurisprudence of 
Blackmun and Stevens abjures the search for the nature of the fetus 
prior to birth, where a realist would search it out, while insisting 
on a form of naive realism about birth itself, where the fetus-infant 
difference cannot be more than nominal. In more concrete terms, 
unborn child's constant right to life throughout pregnancy, abortion may 
sometimes go unpunished in orden to facilitate protective counseling. 
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Blackmun and Stevens would have us believe the child born 
prematurely at seven months to be a human being, while its more 
developed cousin in the womb overdue at nine and a half months is 
still a creature without a fundamentally human nature. Without an 
appeal to some supernatural change such as the insertion of a soul 
at first breath, an appeal which neither judge makes nor consti-
tutionally could make, such a belief is quite simply absurd, beyond 
the limits of even the most extreme credulosity. 
The absurdity of the birth wall has not caused it to fall entirely. 
The United States Supreme Court in fact reaffirmed Roe v. Wade 
in 1992 in Planned Parenthood v. Casey]6 but it did so without 
claiming that birth really makes a difference, explicitly avoiding 
any claim that Roe was rightly decided in the first place. Instead, 
Casey based the right to abort in large measure on stare decisis17, 
binding precedent, which is for Casey a doctrine of court vanity 
and positivism. Past decisions cannot be overturned just because 
they were based on fallacious reasoning ' 8 . Fidelity to the 
Constitution is not by itself a sufficient reason to right old wrongs. 
Only on the basis of new information not available to the earlier 
court can erroneous holdings be overruled 1 9 . Except in such 
16. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833 (1992). 
17. Referring to the cases upholding a constitutional right to contra-
ception, the Court says clearly "We have no doubt as to the correctness of 
those decisions" Id. at 852. The Court then contrasts its view of Roe v. Wade, 
saying only "[T]he reservations any of us may have in reaffirming the central 
holding of Roe are outweighed by the explication of individual liberty we have 
given combined with the force of stare decisis". Id. at 853. See also the 
paragraph quoted infra in the text of this essay at note 23. 
18. "[A] decision to overrule should rest on some special reason over and 
above the belief that a prior case was wrongly decided". Id. at 864. The Court 
indicates that it looks to what "the thoughtful part of the Nation" finds accept-
able in order to see when such a "special reason" may exist. Id. 
19. The Court lists various sorts of such new information: unworkability 
in practice, no significant reliance on the erroneus decision, later contrary case 
law, and changed factual understandings. Id. at 855. 
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circumstances, to correct past mistakes would undermine the Su-
preme Court's prestige, Casey argued, particularly so on matters 
of great controversy 2 0. The abortion fiat stands, but only as such. 
Not willing to deny (or even explicitly to doubt) that millions of 
actual human lives are being lost under Roe, Casey says simply 
that the Court has spoken, causa finita est. 
Referring to "the interest of the State in the protection of 
'potential l i fe ' 2 1 , also characterized as "a legitimate interest in 
promoting the life or potential life of the unborn" 2 2 , the opinion of 
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter declared in sum: 
We do not need to say whether each of us, had we been Members 
of the Court when the valuation of the state interest came before it 
as an original matter, would have concluded, as the Roe Court did, 
that its weight is insufficient to justify a ban on abortions prior to 
viability even when it is subject to certain exceptions. The matter is 
not before us in the first instance, and coming as it does after nearly 
20 years of litigation in Roe's wake we are satisfied that the 
immediate question is not the soundness of Roe's resolution of the 
20. Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the decision approving racial 
segregation, was wrongly decided from the beginnig, according to Casey. Id. at 
863. Nevertheless, it was appropriately overturned by Brown v. Board of 
Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954) only because the "facts, or an understanding of 
facts, changed from those which furnished the claimed justifications for the 
earlier constitutional resolutions". Id. Had no new factual understandings 
emerged, concededly unconstitutional racial segregation would have remained 
the law of the land, according to the Casey doctrine. See also id. at 864-69 for 
a broad discussion of how the Court's need to be perceived as legitimate may 
require it to reaffirm precisely those decisions it regards as extremely wrong. 
"There is a limit to the amount of error that can plausibly be imputed to prior 
Courts". Id. at 866. To exceed that limit would mean that the "legitimacy of 
the Court would face..." Id. Concluding, the Court writes "A decision to 
overrule Roe's essential holding under the existing circumstances would address 
error, of error there was, at the cost of both profund and unnecessary damage 
toe the Court's legitimacy..." Id. at 869. 
21. Id. at 871. 
22. Id. at 870. 
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issue, but the precedential force that must be accorded to its 
holding 2 3 . 
There is good news and bad news in Casey's bold revisionism. 
The good news is that, since the Court no longer assumes that a 
magical change comes about at birth, the unchanging identity of the 
child before and after birth can be affirmed in law - provided 
always that the ultimate right to abortion be preserved. Postnatal 
realism can begin to replace prenatal nominalism. If the child has 
real dignity outside the womb, it must have dignity inside - since 
location cannot make an essential difference. Again in the words of 
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter: 
Regulations which do no more than create a structural mecha-
nism by which the State may express profound respect for the life of 
the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the 
woman's exercise of the right to choose 2 4 . 
For example, laws requiring a woman contemplating abortion to be 
fully informed about the procedure, including what it does to the 
fetus, were declared constitutional by Casey (overruling a contrary 
1983 holding that had read Roe to forbid State attempts to dissuade 
women from having abortions) 2 5. 
Even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact 
rules and regulations designed to encourage her to know that there 
are philosophic and social arguments of great weight that can be 
23. Id. at 871. Although this portion of the Casey opinion was joined in 
only by justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, when the votes of the four 
justices who wished to overrule Roe entirely (Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, and 
White) are added in, there is a solid majority in favor of weakening the right of 
abortion. 
24. Id. at 877. 
25. Id. at882, overruling "Adron I 462 U.S. 416 (1983)" insofar as that 
case held that the State could not week to dissuade women from abortion. 
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brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full 
term 2 6 . . . 
Measures aimed at ensuring that a woman's choice contemplates 
the consequences for the fetus do not necessarily interfere with the 
right recognized in Roe^... 
Though it sometimes still uses the opaque and demeaning 
phrase "potential l i fe" 2 8 for the living human fetus, the Casey 
decision clearly permits state anti-abortion laws to be motivated by 
the "legitimate goal of protecting the life of the unborn" 2 9 , as long 
as their purpose remains "to persuade the woman to choose 
ch i ldb i r th" 3 0 rather than forcibly to stop her from choosing 
abort ion 3 1 . Indeed, already in the 1989 Webster case, the birth 
wall had weakened to the point where the Court had upheld 
Missouri legislation requiring the unborn child, from the moment 
of conception, to be treated as a legal person except insofar as the 
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court might otherwise require 3 2 . 
26. Id. at 872. Note Casey's explicit affirmation that ther are non-religious 
"philosophic and social arguments" against abortion. 
27. Id. at 873. 
28. E.g., at 871. But Casey also uses "life or potential life", e.g., at 852 
and 870, "life of the unborn", e.g., at 883, and even "life of the child his wife 
is carrying" speaking for the majority of the Court at 898. 
29. Id. at 883. 
30. Id. at 878. 
31. Id. at 879. 
32. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 504-07 
(1989). The Court in Webster reversed a federal appellate decision holding that 
Roe did not permitio states to consider the fetus a human being and a person in 
regulations affecting abortion. 
However, the Court approved the Missouri requirement only as a statement 
of principle, leaving itself room to invalidate some applications if it so chose 
at a later date. 
Before Webster, only the Supreme Court decisions approving state refusal 
to fund or otherwise affirmatively support abortion has clearly permitted state 
to act on a fetus-as-human-life point of view in connection with abortion. See 
e.g., Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977). 
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In addition to informed consent, Casey approves a minimum 
24-hour period of reflection between the time the pregnant woman 
is given the required information and the actual abortion 3 3 . But 
Casey's persuade-but do-not-actually-block principle need not stop 
there. After that case was decided, for example, Pennsylvania 
initiated a system of state subsidies for (non-religious, of course) 
pro-life crisis pregnancy centers 3 4 , the sort that had previously 
subsisted almost solely on private contributions and volunteers. 
And if women already in a crisis pregnancy can be given accurate 
factual information 3 5 intended to encourage them to choose life, 
why not public high school students, even as part of a required 
curriculum? Such information may well be more effectively 
integrated into decision-making if it is provided prior to a preg-
nancy-induced sense of desperation. Just such an educational 
initiative appears to be beginning in Florida 3 6. 
Where the Court-declared constitutional right to abortion is not 
even peripherally at issue, the Supreme Court has been still more 
indulgent regarding state action designed to protect unborn human 
33. Id. at 885-87. 
34. "In Pennsylvania, the Future of the Pro-Life Movement?" National 
Catholic Register, May 24-30, page 16. 
35. Note that, although Casey definitely permits the state to take the pro-
life side in seeking to dissuade people from abortion, it assumes that all 
informed consent materials will be "truthful and not misleading" (at 882) and 
"aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and informed, even when in so 
doing the State expresses a preference por childbirth over abortion" (at 883). 
36. See "Public Schools Can Teach Pro-Life", Life Issues Connector, 
April, 1998, page 1. The article discusses the efforts of John Beasley, Ph. D., 
and his group entitled "Freedom to Learn" which aims at getting every public 
school in Armerica to openly teach "both sides" of the abortion issue. 
If the State claimed to be teaching the pros and cons of abortion, then 
Casey, I agree, would require one to present both sides, as Dr. Beasley is 
doing. But if the State, for example, were simply to insist that all biology 
students be told about the facts of fetal development. I do not see why pro-
abortion arguments (e.g., claims of overpopulation) would need to be intro-
duced into the curriculum. Dr. Beasley may be reading Casey less generously 
than he could. 
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beings. Just recently, for example, it refused to review the state 
supreme court's decision upholding a South Carolina statute 
punishing drug use by pregnant women as a form of "child 
endangerment" 3 7 . And at no point post-/?oe has the United States 
Supreme Court ever struck down any of the many state laws 
punishing the killing of a fetus without the mother's permission 3 8 . 
In Minnesota today, an assailtant who intentionally destroys a just-
conceived human embryo - by battering its mother, for example -
can be sentenced to life in prison for "murder of an unborn 
chi ld" 3 9 , even if she was on her way to an abortion clinic at the 
time. 
The "good news", then, is that Roe's never-absolute birth wall 
was partially dismantled by the Casey decision, permitting greater 
recognition and protection for the child prior to birth. Roe's 
postnatal realism has begun, to a degree, to displace its prenatal 
nominalism. 
The "bad news" is of a piece with the good: The weakness of 
the birth wall, the absurdity of thinking that a child's location (or 
its mother's choice) can change its inner nature, can easily permit 
37. Whitner v. South Carolina, 118 S. Ct. 1857 (May 26, 2998). The 
U.S. Supreme Court thus let stand without comment the state court decision 
found at 492 S.E. 2d 777. 
38. For a brief survey of this and other forms of legal recognition of the 
rights of unborn children, see "Legal Protection of the Unborn Child Ouside 
the Context of Induced Abortion", Assoc. Interdic. Res. Bull., Vol. II, n° I, 
March/April 1997, page 1. The article notes that the number of states with 
fetal homicide laws increased from 19 y 1993 to 25 by 1996. By 2998, the 
number had reached 26 according to "Texas Court and Midwest Lawmakers 
Recognize Rights of Preborn", National Catholic Register, May 31-June 6, 
page 16. 
39. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argument that he 
was being treated unfairly in being prosecuted for killing an embryo or fetus 
less than one month after conception when the same act could be done by 
others with impunity State v. Merrill, 450 N.W. 2d 318 (Minn. 1990). 
Wisconsin has just enacted a fetal protection law comparable in strength to 
Minnesota's. National Catholic Register, June 28-July 4, 1998, page 1. 
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Roe's prebirth nominalism to expand to displace realism after birth 
as well. For someone committed to Roe, the realization that there is 
no real difference between abortion and infanticide can mean only 
that infanticide must, at least in principle, be permitted. 
This logic can be seen at work in the current widespread 
support, among pro-Roe people, for the right to kill a fetus during 
induced delivery. If the child partially outside the womb could be 
protected against having its brain sucked out, how could exactly 
the same child still wholly inside be dismembered with impunity? 
In order to avoid this question, the right to partial-birth abortion 
must be affirmed with vigor. 
But even clearer, I think, has been the near-universal support 
for infanticide among pro-abortion academics. I am thinking here 
of people like Fletcher 4 0 , Tooley 4 1 , Green 4 2 , Glover 4 3 , Singer 4 4 , 
and perhaps Pinker 4 5 , but to my knowledge they represent not just 
a majority, but a very solid consensus. I know of no pro-abortion 
academics who think there is something intrinsically wrong with 
early postnatal infanticide 4 6. The reason is obvious: if the newborn 
40. "The only difference between the fetus and the infant is that the infant 
breathes with its lungs. Does this make any significant difference morally or 
from the point of view of values? Surely not... True guilt arises only from an 
offense against a person, and a Down's is not a persona". Joseph FLETCHER, 
"The Right to Die: A Theologian Comments", The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 
221, n° 4, April 1968, at 62-64. 
41. Michael TOOLEY, "Abortion and Infanticide", 2 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 37 
(1972). 
42. Ronald M. GREEN, "Conferred Rights and the Fetus", 2 J. Religious 
Ethics 55 (1974). 
43. Jonathan GLOVER, Causing Death and Saving Lives 137-69 (1977). 
44. See e.g., Peter SINGER, "Killing Babies Isn't Always Wrong", The 
Spectator, 16 September 1995, pp. 20-22. 
45. See the illuminating commentaries on Prof. Steven PINKER'S recent 
article ("Why They Kill Their Newborns", New York Times Magazine, 
November 2, 1997) in 34/1 Human Life Rev. 11 (1998) and in 34/2 Human 
Life Rev. 87 (1998). Pinker later denied that his article had supported infan-
ticide as opposed to providing explanations for it. 
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has intrinsic (real, in our terms) dignity, then the same child 
located in the womb just prior to birth must have equal dignity. 
Indeed, if the newborn infant has inherent dignity, even the just-
conceived embryo must have a like dignity, for the only humanly 
significant attributes possessed by the newborn are possessed as 
well by the embryo: membership in our species and (what comes 
to the same thing) design for human community, with its virtues of 
reason and love. 
To say that actual manifestation of (rather than mere design for) 
these virtues is required for human dignity would be to exclude the 
infant along with the fetus. To focus upon the actualized traits 
possessed by the infant but not the fetus (e.g., size, ability to 
survive with less external life support) would be to include many 
non-human entities and, moreover, would be to point to traits that 
are ultimately just not very important to our idea of human dignity. 
For this very reason, the German Constitution Court ruled unani-
mously in 1975 4 7 , with an entirely different panel reaffirming 
unanimously in 1993 4 8 , that the constitutional right to life must 
46. This was also the finding of a survey by Don MARQUIS, "Why 
Abortion is Immoral", 86 / . Phil. 183, 195-201 (showing that extant pro-
choice theories all deny that there is anything prima facie wrong with killing 
infants). Nevertheless, Glover (and perhaps Pinker and others) would permit 
some (not full) legal prohibition of infanticide in order to avoid "side effects" 
of killing infants. GLOVER, supra note 43. 
47. Judgment of 25 February 1975, 39 BVerfGE 1 (First Senate), 
translated in Robert E. JONAS and John D. GORBY, "West German Abortion 
Decision: A contrast to Roe v. Wade", 9 J. Marshall J. Prac. and Proc. 551 
(1976). 
48. Judgment of 28 May 1993, 88 BVerfGE 203 (Second Senate). For a 
clear summary, see Donald KOMMERS, "The Constitutional Law of Abortion 
in Germany: Should Americans Pay Attention?", 10 J. Contemp. Health L. & 
Pol'y. 1 (1994). 
Note that although the 1975 decision was to a degree ambiguous about 
whether the unborn child itself possesses the right to life, as opposed to being 
only the beneficiary of constitutional protection, the 1993 decision clearly 
resolves the matter in favor of the child having his or her own right. See 
STITH, infra note 52, note 28. See also Udo WERNER, "The Convergence of 
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extend throughout pregnancy. Since we know that newborn 
infants have human dignity, despite the fact that their uniquely 
human virtues subsist only as potentialities, we cannot deny that 
same dignity to the unborn. In that court's own words: 
The process of development ... is a continuing process which 
exhibits no sharp demarcation and does not allow a precise division 
of the various steps of development of the human life. The process 
does not end with birth; the phenomena of consciousness which are 
specific to the human personality, for example, appear for the first 
time a rather long time after birth. Therefore, the protection ... of 
the Basic Law cannot be limited either to the "completed" human 
being after birth or to the child about to be born which is inde-
pendently capable of living ... [N]o distinction can be made here 
between various stages of the life developing itself before birth, or 
between unborn and born l i fe 4 9 . 
Many pro-abortion academics do hope to find a bright line at 
some post-infantile stage of human life. For example, H. Tristam 
Engelhardt, Jr., has averred that true personhood inheres only in 
the normal adult human 5 0 . Such thinkers are still realists; they just 
think that what really matters begins quite a bit later than birth. 
And, in their favor, it must be admitted that almost any develop-
mental point they might choose - e.g., self-consciousness, the age 
of reason, even puberty - will be more real and thus more arguable 
than Roe's choice of birth. But can such points remain bright lines 
in the postmodern era? If the existence of the self is a cognitive 
Abortion Regulation in Germany and the United States", 28 Loyola of Los 
Angeles International and Comparative Law J. 571 (1996). 
Caveat: The German cases do not address the question of the legal status of 
the embryo prior to implantation, and the permit pro-life counseling, as a 
substitute for punishment, to be the means of protecting the child's life. 
49. Judgment of 25 February 1975, supra note 47, Jonas and Gorby 
translation at 638. 
50. "On the Bounds of Freedom: From the Treatment of Fetuses to 
Euthanasia", Conn. Med., Vol. 40, June 1976, at 51-52. See also the quo-
tation from TOOLEY, infra note 52. 
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illusion, as some a rgue 5 1 , how can self-consciousness really 
matter? If reason is only manipulation, an epiphenomenon of 
power, why should it matter more than, say, muscles? It is vain to 
suppose that new attempts to build real walls against killing can be 
successful during our current orgy of deconstruction. 
Rather than search vainly for a new bright line after birth, more 
perspicacious pro-abortion jurists have opted to rid themselves of 
the principle to which we pointed early in this essay, a principle 
that makes it necessary to have bright lines in the first place: human 
equality. If human beings can be treated in radically unequal ways, 
if they need not even in principle be accorded equal protection 
under the law, then those who favor abortion need not be disturbed 
by the continuity of human life. If unequal treatment of human 
beings is acceptable, Stevens' need to assert a fundamental dif-
ference between fetus and infant disappears. Why bother wracking 
one's brain to find a difference if they need not be shown equal 
respect even granting their common humanity? 
Among academics, Ronald Dworkin has perhaps done the most 
to advance human inequality in the law. "The less profitable effort 
invested in each human being, the less regrettable the killing of that 
being" paraphrases an inegalitarian notion that Dworkin applies 
after as well as before birth 5 2 . 
But some of our federal appellate judges have cut even more 
directly to the quick. Seeking to justify lesser state protection for 
51. See discussion in 34/2 Human Life Review, 87, 95 (1998). 
52. See Richard STITH, "On Death and Dworkin: A Critique of His Theory 
of Inviolability", 56 Md. L. Rev. 289 (1997). 
Michael Tooley has suggested slightly less elastic criteria dividing post-
natal humans into the stages of non-persons, quasi-persons and persons: "New-
born humans are neither persons nor even quasi-persons, and their killing is in 
no way intrinsically wrong. At about the age of three months, however, they 
acquire properties that are morally significant... As they develop further, their 
destruction becomes more and more seriously wrong, until eventually it is 
comparable in seriousness to the destruction of a normal adult human being". 
Michael TOOLEY, Abortion and Infanticide, 411-12 (1985). 
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the lives of those terminally disabled, Judge Miner has written for 
the Second Circuit, "Surely the state's interest lessens as the 
potential for life diminishes" 5 3 . For the Ninth Circuit, Judge 
Reinhardt wrote: 
"[The strength of] the state's interest in preserving life ... is 
dependent on relevant circumstances, including the medical condition 
... of the person whose life is at stake" 5 4 . 
Judge Beezer, writing in dissent, countered that the Court is thus 
reexamining "the historic presumption that all human lives are 
equally and intrinsically valuable," and that this reexamination may 
be "a mere rationalization for house-cleaning, cost-cutting and 
burden-shifting - a way to get rid of those whose lives we deem 
worthless". 5 5 
Perhaps because of Judge Beezer's forceful challenge, Judge 
Reinhardt sought to bolster his case with the Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence denying equal protection to the unborn: 
In right-to-die cases, the outcome of the balancing test may differ 
at different points along the life cycle as a person's physical or 
medical condition deteriorates, just as in abortion cases the permis-
sibility of restrictive state legislation may vary with the progression 
of the pregnancy. Equally important, both types of cases raise issues 
of life and death 5 6 . . . 
Judge Beezer did not attempt to deny the majority's analogy to 
abortion law, just to narrow it: 
[I]n the abortion context, the Supreme Court tells us that the 
state's interests in fetal life are weaker before viability than they are 
53. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F. 3d 716, 729 (2nd Cir., 1996). 
54. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 79 F. 3d 790, 817 (9th 
Cir., 1996). 
55. Id. at 856-57. 
56. Id. at 800-01. 
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once the fetus becomes viable. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 845, 112 S. 
Ct. at 2804. A state's interest in preserving human life is stronger 
when applied to viable beings than it is when applied to nonviable 
beings. Like a first-trimester fetus, a person kept alive by life-
sustaining treatment is essentially nonviable. A terminally ill pa-
tient seeking to commit physician-assisted suicide, by contrast, is 
essentially viable. The patient may be inexorably approaching the 
line of nonviability. But the patient is still on the viable side of that 
line, and consequently enjoys the full protection of the state's 
interest in preserving l i fe 5 7 . 
Of course, since even fully viable fetuses enjoy nowhere near the 
"full protection" of the Constitution under Roe and Casey, Judge 
Beezer's analogy is cold comfort even for the disabled person 
capable of surviving without life supports. If such a person counts 
only as much as a viable fetus, she will get far less than equal 
protection from our law. 
In denying the constitutional duty of equal protection, are these 
appellate judges doing anything more than follow the lead of 
Casey! In holding that Roe must stand even if it was wrongly 
decided, which means even if it removed legal protection from 
millions of human beings, Casey proclaimed that the State's duty 
of equal protection falls before stare decisis and the prestige-needs 
of the Court. Reinhardt and Beezer read that case well. 
The honesty newly permitted by the American Supreme Court's 
Casey decision thus cuts in two directions. The fact that the same 
child exists within and without the womb can lead us to two 
opposite conclusions. We can begin to treat the preborn with 
respect equal to that which we now show to already-born human 
beings. Or we can come to treat some of those already born with 
the same disrespect we now show toward the preborn. We can 
become more realistic about the entire human life span, or we can 
begin to doubt the human nature of others thought inconvenient 
and less capable. Or we may finesse the whole problem of 
57. Id. at 851. 
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nominalism vs. realism by denying the State's duty of equal 
protection, leaving the weak to their own devices regardless of 
whether they are human in nature or only in name. 
